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Abstract 
This paper studies the Swedish prohibition of the hazardous solvent Trichloroethylene (TCE). 
Sweden is alone in completely prohibiting its use. The ban has been at best a partial success and 
illustrates the dilemmas of policymaking. Use has declined but not stopped, largely because the decision 
to ban TCE was challenged in the courts. Recently, the EU Court of Justice decided in favor of Sweden’s 
right to have a ban. This article analyzes abatement cost data to show that the cost of replacing TCE is 
low for most plants, although there appear to be a few firms for which it may be quite high. A cross-
country comparison indicates that the Swedish ban was less effective than the very strict technical 
requirements in Germany or the tax used in Norway. A tax (or deposit refund scheme) would be a good 
mechanism to achieve a swift phaseout. 
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Implementation of Policy Instruments for Chlorinated Solvents              
A Comparison of Design Standards, Bans, and Taxes to Phase Out Trichloroethylene  
Daniel Slunge and Thomas Sterner∗ 
Introduction1 
Chlorinated (or halogenated) hydrocarbons are chemicals with very useful characteristics, 
particularly as solvents. Ever since a number of associated environmental problems and health 
hazards have been discovered, however, they have become increasingly controversial. Many of 
these compounds are suspected of being hazardous or toxic either directly or indirectly (after 
transformation). Among the examples cited are the formations of dioxins, which are extremely 
toxic and may be formed, for instance, when waste containing chlorinated hydrocarbons is 
burned. Another example is the effect of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) on the ozone layer. Yet 
other examples are such persistent and bioaccumulating chemicals as DDT and PCB. 
This article evaluates the Swedish policy of banning trichloroethylene (TCE) and 
compares it with the policies used for both TCE and perchloroethylene (PER) in Sweden and 
some other European countries, particularly Norway and Germany.  
Background 
Metal cleaning and degreasing have constituted the dominant use of chlorinated solvents 
in Sweden and most other countries. Metal degreasing is a common process in the metal 
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industry. As soon as a metal object is cut or processed, the fresh surface is in danger of becoming 
corroded. To prevent this and permit storage, the object is covered in oil or grease. When the 
piece is to be soldered or processed in some other way, the grease has to be removed. Similarly, 
for lacquering, assembling, and delivery goods must be clean and dry. Surface fats, oils, wax, or 
soil must be removed. Chlorinated solvents have been popular in metal degreasing because they 
can be applied on different kinds of materials and effectively remove fats and oils. The high 
volatility of chlorinated solvents assures that the goods dry fast after degreasing. In the 
workplace these solvents are superior to certain other volatile solvents, like benzene, which are 
not only toxic but highly flammable and explosive as well.  
Table 1 lists the main uses and some important environmental and health effects of the 
most commonly used solvents.  
Table 1. Chlorinated Solvents 
Solvent  Main use  Environmental and health effects 
111-trichloroethane (C2H3Cl3)  Metal cleaning and 
degreasing 
Ozone depleting 
CFC-113 (C2CL3F3)  Degreasing in electronics 
industry, dry-cleaning 
Ozone depleting 
Carbon tetrachloride (CCl4)  Laboratory  Ozone depleting, carcinogenic 
Trichloroethylene (C2HCl3) 
(TCE) 
Metal degreasing  Toxic, likely carcinogenic 
Perchloroethylene (C2Cl4) 
(PER) 
Dry-cleaning Toxic,  likely  carcinogenic 
Methylene chloride (CH3Cl) Laboratory  Toxic,  likely  carcinogenic 
Health and environmental issues related to these chemicals are complex, and priorities 
change with knowledge. Before damage to the ozone layer was discovered, a number of ozone-
depleting substances (ODS), such as the CFCs, were introduced as substitutes for other 
chlorinated solvents because they were less hazardous to human health. TCE, in fact, was once 
used as an anaesthetic. It should be noted, however, that all these solvents are hazardous to 
human health because they tend to pass easily through skin and membranes and they dissolve 
fats, such as those surrounding nerves and other vital organs. Some of these chemicals may be 
extremely hazardous depending on how they are used. In the early days of degreasing, several 
workers died when welding metals that were still contaminated by TCE, which may form 
phosgene (COCl2, a lethal chemical gas used in some chemical weapons) upon combustion. 
Following the debate on the ozone layer, ODS solvents were phased out and some users tried 
alternatives to chlorinated solvents in metal degreasing, such as water-alkaline processes and Resources for the Future  Slunge and Sterner 
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low-aromatic mineral oils. There was a lot of experimentation with, for instance, lemon peels, 
which are clearly “natural” but contain very strong and quite toxic aromatic compounds. Other 
users, however, reverted to TCE, PER, and methylene chloride. It was the risk of this type of 
substitution that was one of the driving forces behind the Swedish ban on TCE. Decisionmakers 
wanted to avoid creating new workplace health hazards as a by-product of addressing 
environmental problems, such as the ozone layer.  
A number of international treaties bear on chlorinated solvents. The Montreal protocol of 
1987 led to the phaseout of the worst ozone-depleting substances(ODS) (a number of so-called 
HCFCs, which have some but less ozone-depletion effect, are still permitted). Following the 
Montreal protocol, the Swedish parliament adopted a plan to abolish the use of ODS in Sweden. 
The main policy instruments used were import restrictions and total bans on ODS use. The 
ozone-depleting chlorinated solvents were regulated as follows. 
Substance Prohibition 
CFC-113 January  1991 
111-trichloroethane January  1995 
Carbon tetrachloride  Professional use, January 1993; all uses, 
January 1996 
 
Between 1988 and 1994 the use of ODS decreased by 93% (Östman et al. 1995). The 
Swedish strategy to regulate ODS was thus quite successful, but because of fear that it would 
lead to greater use of other hazardous solvents, TCE was prohibited. 
Perchloroethylene, which is chemically close to TCE, is used mainly in dry-cleaning but 
also, to some extent, in the printing and metals industries. The only regulation of PER in 
Sweden2 is a maximum exposure limit in the working environment of 10 parts per million (ppm). 
Although there is no ban on the professional use of PER, its use decreased from 1,600 tons in 
1988 to 250 tons in 1995. The decrease is due mainly to a modernization of the machinery used 
in dry-cleaning, from open to closed systems (Naturvårdsverket 1997). 
Despite that decrease and the stringent ambient standard, a number of old PER machines 
are still around. Some of these are open systems and, in a recent report by the Swedish 
environmental protection agency (Naturvårdsverket 4725), many were described as poorly 
maintained and having insufficient reporting routines, high emissions, and other problems. Only 
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20% of the open machines and 55% of the closed ones have carbon filters. According to the 
report, considerable reductions could be achieved by forbidding open systems and requiring 
other technical improvements at a cost of 23 to 47 SEK/kg3. It was earlier believed there were no 
technical alternatives, but it is now clear that alternatives are becoming more common. Because 
many dry-cleaners are small enterprises located in the midst of apartment blocks and other 
housing and commercial areas, the risk of unintended exposure is relatively high. It might be 
considered a paradox that TCE should be forbidden but not PER. 
Selection and Design of Policy Instruments 
Some people think environmental policymaking is either “command and control” or 
economic policy instruments—that is, taxes—but the spectrum of choices is much more subtle. 
Market-based instruments range from taxes, charges, and deposit refunds to tradable permit 
schemes for fishery management and pollution control. Information provision, ecolabeling, 
liability, refunded emissions payments, subsidies, voluntary agreements, and many other 
schemes show that there is, in fact, a menu of policies.  
The choice of policy instruments depends on both the ecological and economic 
conditions and the selection criteria (see Sterner 2001). With several goals, such as efficiency, 
incentive compatibility, fairness in the distribution of costs, and political feasibility, one would 
expect to find different combinations of policy instruments for different tasks. 
The criteria also turn out to be of varying importance, depending on the conditions that 
characterize the issue. For environmental problems with moderate abatement costs in an 
economy with an even distribution of income, equity issues may be less important and efficiency 
paramount. Conversely, for issues that affect health and ultimately life in countries with large 
income disparities, distributional concerns and fairness may be more important than efficiency. 
In markets characterized by powerful monopolies or marked information asymmetries, the issues 
of incentive compatibility may well dominate. In other cases, it may be the complexity of the 
ecosystem that determines the design of the instrument. If there is a risk of serious and 
irreversible damages, then precaution may dictate the use of some very direct instruments, like 
prohibitions. But if the prohibitions are not effective and lead to lobbying rather than research 
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into new technologies, then market-based instruments that encourage such research may be more 
efficient. 
A question that particularly interests us is whether bans are good policy instruments in 
the case of TCE. Traditional environmental economic analysis (Weitzman 1974) suggests that if 
the marginal cost of abatement is very steep or close to the zero limit (and the environmental 
damage curve is not so steep), then taxes (or some other price instrument) would appear better. If 
technical progress is expected to be fast but unevenly distributed among specific application 
areas, this preference for taxes would be strengthened by considerations of dynamic efficiency.  
Under asymmetric information the choice of instrument is more complex. When an 
environmental protection agency imposes regulation, a company has an obvious incentive to 
overestimate abatement costs to get a “generous” emissions concession. When taxes are the 
instrument, the company does not have an incentive to overestimate abatement costs, since that 
would imply that the equilibrium tax necessary is high, too. One might  think the firm has an 
incentive to underestimate, but this incentive is likely to be weak because it amounts to 
acknowledging that abatement is easy. Hence the tax instrument is likely to lead to fairly truthful 
reporting. This is an example of the “revelation principle” used to deal with policymaking under 
asymmetric information. Furthermore, the tax promotes rapid technological change: if a 
company has a 10-year concession, it has little incentive to develop or even adopt new 
technology, but if taxes are used, the incentive is to adopt new technology as soon as possible.  
It is also important to focus on competition as well as on the politics and economics 
of firms’ behavior with respect to environmental policy. There are, as pointed out by Albrecht 
(1998), contradictory hypotheses. The “industrial flight and pollution haven” hypothesis states 
that strict regulation will lead to industrial relocation. This is, in principle, what most economists 
would expect based on comparative advantage, although the effect is likely to be very small and 
the empirical evidence is not clear. We also have the Porter hypothesis, formulated by Harvard 
management guru Michael Porter, who suggests that environmental regulation will increase 
productivity through the secondary effects of innovation.  
The logic of the Porter hypothesis has been criticized by economists who argue that if the 
productivity opportunities are real, they will be exploited irrespective of legislation (Oates et al. 
1994). As the critics recognize, however, it is possible to construct models with some other 
market or regulatory imperfection that could lead to the existence of a Porter effect; see, for 
instance, Bonato and Schmutzler (2000). The model by Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) Resources for the Future  Slunge and Sterner 
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confirms the logical impossibility of the pure Porter effect but points to a number of mechanisms 
implying that the cost of compliance with regulation may be very low. 
The issue of compliance has also received considerable attention; it is sometimes thought 
to be a paradox that firms comply even if monitoring and enforcement are far from perfect. 
Various explanations have been offered for this so-called Harrington paradox, including the 
notion that compliance confers benefits, such as market advantages related to image (Arora and 
Gangopadhyay 1995; Harrington 1988; Arora and Cason 1996). Heyes has written extensively 
on monitoring and regulation, and Heyes and Liston-Heyes (1999) conclude that many business 
executives agree with Porter and then through lobbying build a model for regulation to show that 
the regulating agency should take account of Porter’s views even if it considers them wrong and 
misguided.  
The Ban on Trichloroethylene 
In 1991 the Swedish Parliament passed a law prohibiting the professional use of TCE and 
methylene chloride, effective January 1, 1996. The use of TCE in consumer products was 
banned  in 1993. A complete prohibition on all use might seem to be a very strong policy 
instrument, but it has not been wholly effective. The reason appears to be that the very strength 
of the instrument is in some sense its weakness: the ban is so absolute that it creates strong 
opposition among some users, who either find it particularly difficult to replace TCE or simply 
disapprove of the timing or policy method. The Swedish experience has shown that some firms 
spend a great deal of effort and resources in appealing and lobbying against the ban and gather 
support from industry associations and others. To some extent they hoped to get support from 
European Union (EU) institutions on the grounds that the ban might hinder the free mobility of 
goods.  
The impetus for the ban was TEC’s detrimental health and environmental effects, 
mentioned earlier. These consequences have been challenged, however, and, in fact, the 
environmental damage of TCE does not appear to be as serious as that from CFCs or even 
HCFCs. If the health effects are no worse than for certain other solvents, perhaps restrictions on 
maximum exposure in the working environment would have been enough. Sweden does have a 
stringent exposure limit of 10 ppm, compared with 100 ppm in the United States (eight-hour 
time-weighted average). Only Germany has a stricter standard: a limit of 20 ppm, which, 
combined with additional technical and workplace requirements, including completely closed 
systems for operation and even storage and transport, reduces ambient levels to 1 ppm or less Resources for the Future  Slunge and Sterner 
7 
(Lerrach 2000), with the result that a number of degreasing units currently operating in Sweden 
would not be able to operate in Germany. 
Those comparisons are particularly relevant because TCE was brought in as a 
replacement when other solvents, such as highly aromatic hydrocarbons and CFCs, were phased 
out for health or environmental reasons. This was, for instance, the case at the SKF factory in 
Gothenburg, which, in the early 1980s, used around 3,000 to 4,000 tons of TCE per year (almost 
half Sweden’s consumption at the time). The firm introduced TCE as a replacement for both 
CFCs and highly aromatic nafta products. 
Reducing Use of TCE—The First Phase  
Figure 1 shows the use of TCE in Sweden to 1996, when it was first to have been phased 
out. Quite clearly, the ban did not cause the phaseout of TCE; perhaps it might be considered the 
logical last step in a phase out, or the only instrument capable of stopping the residual 
applications after other policies  had reduced its use. By the time the decision to ban TCE was 
made, consumption had already fallen from about 9,000 tons per year to 3,000 tons. The decision 
to ban was followed by a period of fairly stable use: It seems that industries did little or nothing 
between 1991 and 1995 to prepare for the ban and, in fact, many executives have said in 
interviews that they did not think the authorities were serious about this ban, especially since  
TCE had a long history and no other countries were banning it. At the same time, Sweden was 
preparing for entry into the EU, where it was not banned, and TCE became a fairly important 













Figure 1. Use of TCE in Sweden 1978—1999. 
Total ban 1996
Decision on ban Resources for the Future  Slunge and Sterner 
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Source: Naturvårdsverket (the Swedish environmental protection agency). 
During the second half of the 1980s, large industries faced emissions standards and 
tighter exposure limits that forced them to reduce their use of TCE or phase it out completely. 
The standards and regulations led either to the use of other technologies and other solvents or, 
more commonly, to the adoption of closed systems with carbon filters, which allowed a drastic 
reduction. As an example, we may look at the case of SKF, which accounted for a large share of 
consumption. SKF used TCE for three purposes: 
•  ordinary degreasing; 
•  as a solvent for fats used as antioxidants; and 
•  dewatering of sensitive components. 
SKF is an interesting case not only because of its size but also because the demands are 
unusually exacting. Ball bearing components must be dried within 30 seconds, after which 
corrosion becomes unacceptable. Moreover, the size and shape of the product makes substitution 
more difficult than in many other types of manufacturing, where, for instance, large sheets of 
metal need degreasing before they are welded. Thus, although one could argue that SKF has 
more resources and thus can more easily accommodate to environmental restrictions, at least 
technically one might argue the opposite: if SKF can eliminate TCE, then many other industries 
should find it fairly easy.4  
Reduction in use of TCE at SKF was driven by two factors: the trade union demands on 
working environment and the environmental requirements for reduced emissions. When use was 
at its peak, SKF was emitting 250 tons per year into the air. In its 1983 permit SKF was ordered 
to reduce annual emissions to a maximum of 15 tons. Installing active carbon filters led to a two-
thirds reduction, to about 80 tons per year, but further reductions required changes in processes. 
New degreasing processes that used water and (low-aromatic) oils and new packaging and 
storage routines were combined with the use of lighter oils for conservation of ball bearings 
instead of wax, whose removal required TCE as a solvent.  
Finally, only very small amounts of TCE were being used, and the costs of maintaining 
the handling, storage, and filter facilities became disproportionate. Furthermore, SKF discovered 
it could gain in good will and environmental image by exceeding the requirements instead of 
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reacting passively to them. The company therefore decided to phase out all use of TCE. This 
decision applied to all SKF plants abroad, even if local authorities did not require it, for two 
reasons: environmental image, and uniformity of standards and processes to ensure 
homogeneous product quality. 
The Ban and the Ensuing Legal Battles  
SKF is one case; in some other companies the ban on TCE led to bitter opposition and 
protests. Many petitions and articles were written and a number of companies decided to fight 
the legislation5, threatened to close down or leave the country, and have appealed to the courts. 
Leading points of contention are that the industries disapprove of the prohibition as a method, its 
timing, and a number of its consequences, which we discuss below. Here we briefly recapitulate 
some of the more salient points. In 1994, 39 industries published an open letter to Prime Minister 
Ingvar Carlsson as an advertisement in a leading Swedish newspaper (Dagens Industri 1994), 
saying that the prohibition was poorly motivated and prepared and should be withdrawn. They 
contended that their viability was threatened and that more than half of them would have to move 
abroad if the prohibition was enforced.  
The letter was strongly worded—even excessive, as several executives admitted later in 
interviews—but its tone was indicative of industry’s strong resentment of the regulation. 
Although some companies did phase out TCE rather than move abroad, others applied for 
waivers. Originally the ban was to take effect on January 1, 1996. Because a number of 
companies had difficulties and there was considerable resistance, the Chemicals Inspectorate 
issued a general exemption for any companies that could report difficulties. In the first year 
(1996) some 500 companies were given waivers, effectively postponing the ban until January 1, 
1997. After that date only companies that could show that they had made a serious effort to 
substitute for TCE and had a plan for doing so would be granted (a temporary) exemption. These 
companies would also pay an exemption fee of 150 SEK/kg—a fee intended not so much as an 
environmental tax as a way to remove any disadvantage that a complying company might suffer 
vis-à-vis competitors that had not yet invested in TCE substitution. 
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Of the 283 companies that applied for exemptions for 1997, 137 were granted waivers, 
and 60 of the companies whose applications were rejected appealed the decision. The Stockholm 
County Administrative Court revoked the decisions made by the Chemicals Inspectorate, and 
there have been several further rounds of appeal to higher courts. When Sweden joined the EU in 
1994, Holland, the U.K., and the EU Commission were very critical of the ban, largely because 
Sweden does not produce TCE and had imported the chemical, and thus the ban would be a 
barrier to trade. However, Sweden fiercely defended the ban by citing politicians’ pledge during 
the EU campaign that membership would not compromise the country’s environmental goals. 
The ban thus became a symbol and as such the subject of a fight with considerable prestige. 
Meanwhile, Sweden’s Chemicals Inspectorate modified its rules for exemption, dropping 
the requirement that the firm present a plan for the phaseout of TCE and modifying the fee 
structure. The new requirements were as follows: 
•  the company is actively researching other alternatives; 
•  no suitable alternative is readily accessible for the company’s needs; and  
•  no harmful exposure results from the use of TCE. 
The exemption fee was later withdrawn entirely, since the EU Commission considered it 
“out of proportion” to the environmental damage. Of the 220 companies that applied for waivers 
to continue using TCE after 1997, all were granted, along with 121 waivers in 1998 and roughly 
150 in 1999. The case of one company, Toolex Alpha, was referred to the European Court of 
Justice (by a Swedish court) to determine whether the Swedish prohibition was in accordance 
with the free movement of goods (case C-473/98).  
A number of interesting general principles of European law underlie the legal struggle. 
First, the prohibition must be in the public interest and not a hidden trade restriction. Second, it 
must be necessary and nondiscriminatory. Third, the law should be proportional—that is, not 
unreasonably harsh in comparison with its goal. On July 11, 2000, the European Court of Justice 
ruled that the Swedish prohibition did not run counter to EU legislation on the free movement of 
goods, reasoning that  
•  the basis for the prohibition was concern for health and the environment; 
•  the EU has classified TCE as toxic and carcinogenic;  Resources for the Future  Slunge and Sterner 
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•  Member countries have the right to stricter environmental legislation6 
•  there is no basis to assume the prohibition was motivated by an attempt to stop trade; 
and 
•  there are reasonable possibilities of getting a waiver. 
The last point was important: It appears that an absolute phaseout with no exceptions 
would have been considered disproportionate. Hence, one might with some exaggeration say that 
the prohibition was accepted because it was watered down by the greater likelihood of obtaining 
a waiver. Considering the sensitive issue of national sovereignty in environmental 
decisionmaking and the relatively skeptical attitude of the Swedish electorate vis-à-vis the EU, it 
seems wise that Sweden has been allowed to keep its independent (and at least in some sense 
more radical) national policy on this issue. There remains, however, the broader question of 
whether prohibition as such is a good policy instrument in this case. Recall that Sweden is alone 
in prohibiting TCE, and that TCE and methylene chloride are the only chlorinated solvents for 
which Sweden has chosen this rather drastic measure. 
Marginal Costs of Abatement or TCE Substitution 
To study the marginal cost of abatement, we looked at the applications for exemption 
from the 1996 ban, which were required to contain information on the economic consequences 
of a substitution—that is, the marginal cost of substitution. Although these figures may 
reasonably be assumed to be biased estimates, since their very purpose is to provide the basis for 
an exemption, we also have data from other sources: detailed interviews with a number of 
companies on their use of TCE and the actual costs of substitution, and other studies, including 
one by the Swedish Chemicals Inspectorate that includes figures on the cost of substituting for 
TCE. The data cover the whole range of companies, from SKF to some very small workshops, 
and represent different sectors of industry; they also include companies that both have and have 
not made the required investments (see Slunge 1997). 
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Figure 2 MC of abatement for companies that had replaced TCE  
Source Slunge (1997) 
We have standardized assumptions concerning the real rate of interest (4%) and the 
useful life of capital equipment (15 years) as well as made reasonable assumptions in each case 
about investment costs and (what turned out to be more difficult) operating costs. We found that 
the cost estimates were not only higher but also much more uncertain (i.e., the estimates had a 
higher variance) for companies that had not carried out the investments. This reflects true 








Figure 3. Estimated Marginal Cost of Abatement for Companies That Had Not Yet 
Replaced TCE.  Source: Slunge (1997). 
Figures 2 and 3 present the marginal costs for a number of companies and illustrate the 
effects of either uncertainty or tactical estimates by companies that do not want to comply with 
the ban. The companies that had phased out TCE incurred an average and median cost of 6 
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but an average of 84 SEK/kg TCE, due to some very high (maybe protest) estimates. To cast 
some light on which of these factors is most important, we looked in greater detail at those 
companies for which we have the best data and examined the marginal costs of abatement for 
different steps in phasing out TCE. As in the case of SKF, the first reductions in quantity were 
sometimes very easy, since they mainly required closing systems and installing carbon filters, 
which (at least in large-scale use) were inexpensive. However, the next step in abatement actions 
turned out to be much more difficult and expensive. 
Figure 4. Marginal Cost of Abatement in Nine Companies.  
Source: Slunge (1997). 
Figure 4 has been split into two because of scale: One company reported that the last 
10% was so expensive (marginal cost = 600 SEK/kg) that most of the other variation reported 
(generally, marginal costs between –10 and 40 SEK/kg) would have been invisible on a scale 
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Most evidence we have shows that in most cases substitution of other chemicals for TCE 
is relatively if not very cheap. There remains some evidence that it might be very expensive in 
some special cases, but it is difficult to judge whether this is due to tactical exaggeration or lack 
of knowledge by the individual firms, or a reflection of special needs or circumstances of an 
individual firm.7 For example, the residues may be very difficult to remove, or the demands on 
cleanliness very high, or the technical specifications are in some other way exacting. More 
commonly, a company may have recently invested in expensive, closed-cycle TCE degreasing 
equipment and cannot afford in the short run to throw out this equipment and install new 
degreasers. Some companies are small and lack either space (the water-based equipment is 
typically larger) or time (they may be temporarily overloaded with work or understaffed). There 
are also firms that have special financial situations and cannot borrow money for this type of 
investment. A small company whose owner is the only technical expert may find that closing the 
plant to install new equipment could well be prohibitively costly.If a small company is working 
overtime to expand in a new direction or struggling to catch up with orders, a management 
distraction of even a week or two on “side issues” like degreasing may carry a very considerable 
cost: the opportunity cost of management. This type of cost is hard to quantify and not included 
in our material, but it is reflected in the strong statements some small companies have made 
about the prohibition.  
In many instances companies facing tougher environmental restrictions have initially 
reacted by saying that the new requirements are impossible to meet and will force plant closure. 
It is not uncommon that after a couple of years, they find it was much easier than anticipated, 
and there is even anecdotal evidence that new processes turn out to cost less or improve product 
quality. This is a version of the Porter hypothesis—that efficiency is enhanced by tough 
environmental standards. However, some such cases may be due to a coincidence of 
technological progress, and it is not easy to distinguish the companies that may be bluffing from 
the ones that face true difficulties. 
 
                                                 
7 If there is such a variation in abatement costs, we would expect to find the firms with higher costs in the group of 
companies that have not yet carried out abatement. Uncertainty, tactical reporting, and selection thus all pull in the 
same direction and cannot easily be distinguished. Resources for the Future  Slunge and Sterner 
15 
Figure 5. Marginal Abatement Cost and Effects of Tax Compared with Ban. 
Source: Slunge (1997). 
Figure 5 shows the reported marginal costs of abatement for 46 companies applying for 
exemption from the Chemicals Inspectorate ban, with the actual marginal costs for 19 other 
companies, from their databases and our interviews. This is in no way a representative sample of 
companies. A very large share of emissions carries a low marginal cost of abatement, and an 
environmental tax or fee of 50 SEK/kg would probably have sufficed to effect most (around 
90%) of the abatement. A higher fee would incidentally not appear to have much of an effect on 
this figure if the costs of abatement rise as dramatically at the end as they appear to in Figure 5. 
As we have pointed out, these cost estimates may be exaggerated, but neither the regulator nor 
the researcher can know for certain. Although there are environmentally reasonable and 
technologically viable solutions to degreasing without TCE, the compliance costs for an 
individual firm may yet be high, particularly if the firm is required to comply very fast and not 
given time to adapt.  
Alternative Policies: Taxes, Technology Standards, and Deposit Refunds 
Policy alternatives worth considering in this context are taxes, stricter emissions 
requirements, and a deposit refund (DR) scheme or special environmental fees, as distinct from 
taxes. The DR is particularly useful when the effluents or emissions are small or hard to monitor. 
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on the polluter. If the polluter does not emit and can prove this by handing back the appropriate 
amount of the substance, the tax is refunded. This sort of refund has the advantage of reducing 
net payments from the industry to the environmental authorities or to the state budget, which 
reduces political resistance. DRs have the added advantage of specifically targeting emissions, 
rather than use, which makes good closed systems more attractive. Since it is the emissions that 
entail health and environmental problems, the firm pays at the margin only for the TCE that is 
not recycled.  
Targeted emissions fees would be like taxes on TCE except that the proceeds would not 
go to the government’s treasury but instead fund some program in which the concerned industry 
has an interest—research into alternative degreasing technologies, for example, or loans on 
favorable terms for special cases.8 This runs counter to the usual public economics arguments 
against earmarking, but we are concerned here with very minor funds of a transient nature. The 
interest for the treasury is minutethe politically important aspect is gaining some support or 
understanding and preferably partnership with the industry to avoid the kind of confrontation 
that has characterized the Swedish prohibition. 
Norway has recently implemented a tax per kilo on both TCE and PER of 50 Norwegian 
crowns(roughly equivalent to the Swedish ones) that combines elements of both tax and DR, 
since firms have the right to reclaim half the tax paid on delivery of TCE sludge delivered to 
special treatment plants or authorized recyclers. Considering that the market price of TCE is 10 
to 15 crowns, a tax of 50 crowns may be expected to have a significant impact, and that in fact is 
what our firm-level inquiries suggest. The main alternative policy considered in Norway was a 
prohibition. Industry reactions to the tax have not been enthusiastic; nevertheless, there appears 
to be an appreciation of the fact that the tax allows firms much more flexibility than an outright 
ban. 
Germany has employed very tough technical requirements concerning emissions that 
apply to both PER and TCE. When PER from dry-cleaners was found in adjacent apartments in 
both air and foodstuffs, regulations were imposed, calling for completely closed systems for 
PER; that policy was then expanded to TCE. As a result, PER and TCE (as well as 111-
                                                 
8 Another possibility is simply to refund the payments to the industries concerned. This is done with fees on NOx 
emissions in Sweden (see Sterner and Höglund 2000). These refunded emission payments (REPs) are paid back in 
proportion to output. The charge is rather like grandfathered emissions permits, or a “competition” in which the 
“dirtier-than-average” plants in an industry pay emissions fees not to the regulator but to the cleaner plants. Resources for the Future  Slunge and Sterner 
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trichloroethane and dichloromethane) have all been drastically reduced—roughly by a factor ten 
in 15 years (more than 50% from 1986 to 1991, when the unification of Germany creates a break 
in the figures, and then another 80% from 1991 to 2000). These figures show a decline that is 
somewhat faster decline than in Sweden or Norway (see Figure 6) and considerably faster than 
in the EU as a whole. Comparing EU and German figures, it is clear that for 1993–1998 
Germany alone accounts for half the reduction (and thus 10% of use in 1993 but only 5% in 
1998). For PER, Germany accounts for 9 of the total 11 kilotonnes of EU reduction. It would 
seem that the German focus on health issues and thus the joint emphasis on TCE and PER make 
good sense. At the same time the industrial policies, which were worked out in close cooperation 
with industry, also focus on workers’ health and on technological improvement. This has had the 
added advantage of being an incentive for the machine industry, and Germany is now the main 













Figure 6. Relative Rates of Reduction of TCE in Sweden, Germany, and Norway. 
The Norwegian tax took effect in 2000 and thus it is too early to fully evaluate its effects. 
As Norwegian data show, there was hardly any decrease in Norwegian demand before 2000, and 
in fact the 25% increase during 1999 might be attributed to pretax hoarding. According to the 
Eriksen (2000, 2001), the tax has been very effective, and preliminary figures show that 
purchases of TCE have fallen from more than 500 tons in 1999 to 82 tons in 2000. For PER the 
figures show a reduction from 270 tons in 1999 to 26 tons in 2000. Even if the 1999 purchases 
included some buildup of stockpiles, it is clear from the size of the reductions that the use of 
TCE and PER is far below pretax levels. All in all, we see that the Swedish policy was more Resources for the Future  Slunge and Sterner 
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effective than the pre-1999 Norwegian policy (which was fairly lax), but it seems to be less 
effective than the Norwegian tax. 
Compliance Incentives and the Reputation of Regulators 
The Swedish policy has also led to reduced use of TCE, but as shown in Figure 1, the ban 
has not been entirely effective. Many companies with seemingly moderate abatement costs have 
chosen to fight the ban rather than abate. The threat of sanctions was apparently not credible. 
The risk of formal sanctions was reduced when a large number of firms coordinated their efforts; 
they appeared to think the Swedish authorities had a weak case. As for informal, market 
sanctions, it is noteworthy that larger companies, such as SKF, quickly eliminated their use of 
TCE. Small companies, in contrast, may not have been concerned about their image, perhaps 
because of their size or because they did not sell consumer products and did not think their 
corporate customers would be sensitive to this issue. In this case, the logic was clear: Fighting 
the ban costs little more than the effort of writing the letters, and companies facing regulatory 
instruments have an incentive to exaggerate the costs of abatement.  
Even though the ban has survived legal challenge (it would have been extremely 
embarrassing to the Chemicals Inspectorate had it been struck down), implementation has been 
an uphill battle. Might this process have shown, once and for all, the legal powers of the national 
authorities and thus strengthened the likelihood that prohibitions would be used in similar future 
cases? We think that is an unlikely interpretation. In our view, the ban survived because it was 
watered down by the generous exemptions; the legal and media battles were exhausting but 
ultimately non- or even counterproductive. Prohibition will no doubt be used again, but the 
authorities will restrict it to more clearcut cases, as when health or environmental damage is 
more dramatic or international opinion more coordinated. Prohibitions that are, like this ban, not 
immediately successful portend problems for the policymaker: 
•  The planned environmental improvement is, after all, not (immediately) achieved. 
•  A greater improvement could perhaps have been achieved, at lower cost. 
•  The regulating agency suffers a loss of prestige (this is possibly one goal of the 
companies that fight the legislation), and the energy and confidence needed to enforce 
other regulations vis-à-vis the noncomplying companies may be weakened. In 
Sweden, these companies now have less incentive to comply with future regulations 
or initiatives from the Chemicals Inspectorate. Resources for the Future  Slunge and Sterner 
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•  The regulating agency also suffers  loss of prestige vis-à-vis the complying 
companies. Companies that in good faith followed the regulations and invested in 
new equipment (in some cases at great expense) found that their efforts had been 
“unnecessary” and their competitors did not even have to pay environmental fines or 
compensatory fees. Several companies have brought this kind of complaint, and their 
experience may reduce the incentive for compliance with future regulations or 
initiatives. 
•  The regulating agency must rules on polluters’ applications for waivers. Besides 
wasting inspectors’ time, this opens up the possibility of arbitrary decisions and, in 
theory, even corruption. 
•  The uncertainty caused by a proposed ban may discourage investment in new 
technology. For many years the Swedish industry was hesitant, and anecdotal 
evidence has it that unsuitable temporary methods (such as manual degreasing in 
petrol in open air) were used because of the uncertainty. It is perhaps an irony that 
half a dozen Swedish companies have now ordered German closed-loop degreasing 
machines. They are convinced the machines are good (giving some credit to German 
policy) but do not know whether they can run them on TCE in Sweden—but if not, 
they can always use PER instead! 
Conclusions 
It is always risky to draw conclusions based on the partial experience of just a few 
countries. Observed results are due to a combination of policies and other factors, and it is hard 
to disentangle the effect of any one of them. The Norwegian policy is so new that we have only 
one year of data. The German case is complicated and consists of many different elements. For 
Sweden, a tentative conclusion—drawn with the benefit of hindsight—is that the authorities 
would have been more successful implementing harsh technical requirements and a monetary 
instrument applied over a somewhat broader range of chemicals than outright banning just one 
chemical, TCE. Thus, for instance, a fee on the use of a wide spectrum of chlorinated 
hydrocarbons, including both TCE and PER (as well as some other similar substances) might 
have provoked less resistance and achieved the same reduction we have seen—and maybe more. 
Exemptions could have been made for a few types of use where the costs of abatement were 
high and the health risk was low. If the fees had been earmarked for environmental collaboration 
with the industry association, the results might even have been enhanced. Resources for the Future  Slunge and Sterner 
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